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RECENT DECISIONS

on community market value; and (3) that the debtor may obtain
clear title to the property by payment of the appraised value, including the amount of the incumbrances, subject to the demand
of the
18
secured creditor that the property be sold at public sale.
J. E. H.

BROKER-LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTY TO AGENT-COMMISSIONS.

-Plaintiffs, real estate brokers, were employed by the owner of
certain premises to effect the sale of the premises. Plaintiffs
approached the defendants to induce them to purchase the property.
Several proposals were made by the plaintiffs and rejected by the
defendants. In the course of one of the conferences, one of the
plaintiffs suggested: "I have got an idea where I can show you how
you can buy the property without any cash at a price of $145,000.
Would you be interested ?" The owner consented to the terms offered
by the plaintiffs and orally accepted by the defendants, but the latter
changed their minds and the plaintiffs sue, alleging an employment
of them by defendants, a breach by defendants of that contract of
employment and demand as damages a sum measured by the amount
of the commissions which defendants were alleged to have prevented
plaintiffs from receiving from the owner. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision for the defendants on the ground that the
evidence failed to prove a contract of employment of plaintiffs by
defendants. Grossnn et al. v. Herman et al., 266 N. Y. 249, 194
N. E. 694 (1935).
The mere fact that brokers have been employed by an owner to
procure a sale or lease of real estate need not in itself necessarily
prevent such brokers, under proper circumstances, from accepting
employment also from a purchaser or a lessee.' But in order to
recover commissions from the latter, the broker has the burden of
proving a contract of employment between them.2 Such a contract
has been inferred although the broker was already under contract
with the owner. 3 In the instant case the facts did not constitute an
employment between the brokers and the prospective purchasers. The
latter's acceptance of the proposition made by the brokers who were
then acting for the owner would not justify the inference of an
"In re Slaughter, U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. Texas, Oct. 12, 1935, reported
in Commerce Clearing House, Bankruptcy Law Service, p. 3621 (holding the
new section constitutional). Contra: It re Young. N. Y. Times, Oct. 22,

1935, at 1, reporting a decision of the U. S. Dist. Ct., Ill. In re Sherman Bkpt.,
N. Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1935, at 6, reporting a decision of U. S. Dist. Ct., Va.

'Knauss v. Gottfried Krueger Brewing Co., 142 N. Y. 70, 36 N. E. 867
(1894).
'Parker v. Simon, 231 N. Y. 503, 132 N. E. 404 (1921).
'Pease & Elliman, Inc. v. Gladwin Realty Co., 216 App. Div. 421, 215 N.
Y. Supp. 346 (1st Dept. 1926).
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employment of the brokers by the defendants. The brokers throughout were acting merely as intermediaries for the owner to offer
proposals and transmit acceptances. There was no evidence that
defendants had agreed, expressly or impliedly, to pay commissions
or that the parties ever contracted with reference to commissions, or
even contracted at all. Whether a contract of employment of the
broker by prospective purchasers arises, in addition to that of the
broker by4 the owner, depends in the last analysis on the facts of
each case.
H. S.
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delivered to defendant in New York merchandise for transportation
and delivery to a consignee in another state. Defendant admittedly
misdelivered the goods. Plaintiff filed a claim with defendant fifteen
months after the loss occurred. The uniform express receipt, under
which the merchandise was shipped, stipulated that such claims must
be filed within six months and fifteen days after the date of shipment.' Held, as the conceded ntisdelivery, unexplained, constituted
negligence on the part of the carrier, the stipulation is void, for the
requirement of the filing of a claim with the carrier, as a condition
precedent to an action for a loss occurring in transit through the
carrier's negligence, violates the Interstate Commerce Act. 2 Lefcort
et al. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 154 Misc. 630, 278 N. Y.
Supp. 238 (Mutt. Ct. 1935).
Even prior to the enactment of the original Interstate Commerce
Act,3 stipulations that written notice of a claim for loss of, or damage
to, goods shipped shall be given within a designated time were held
'Thus, in McKnight v. McGuire, 117 Misc. 306, 191 N. Y. Supp. 323 (lst
Dept. 1921) the following statement made by the prospective lessee was held to
bind him to a contract, breach of which resulted in a recovery by the broker;
"If you can get that house for two years for $250 a month I will take it." In
James v. Home of the Sons and Daughters of Israel, 153 N. Y. Supp. 169
(App. T. 1st Dept. 1915) where the prospect told the broker to get the property
at a certain price, after the owner had agreed to the price, and the prospect
refused to proceed, the broker was awarded damages for breach of contract.
1Clause 7 of the uniform express receipt provided in part: " * * * as
conditions precedent to recovery claims must be made in writing to the originating or delivering carriers * * * in case of failure to make delivery * * * within
six months and fifteen days after date of shipment * * *."
2As amended (44 STAT. 1448 [1927], 49 U. S. C. A. §20 [11] [1928]) it
provides in part: "* * * if the loss * * * was due to * * * negligence while the
property was in transit * * * then no * * * filing of claim shall be required as
a condition precedent to recovery * *
'24 STAT. 386 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. §20 (11) (1928).

